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Earlier this week, 32 leading scholars of EU law and politics signed the
statement that national courts cannot override CJEU judgments, in response to a
demonstration by the BVerfG that it actually can. Yet, might is not right, suggest the
signatories of the statement, to argue that “the German’s court […] assertion that it
can declare that a CJEU judgment ‘has no binding force in Germany’ is untenable
and must be forcefully rejected”. We share the signatories’ concern that Weiss might
(and most probably will) be used as a pretext for refusing to comply with the CJEU’s
rulings and the EU rule of law requirements in Member States such as Poland or
Hungary. We are also critical of the conclusion to which the BVerfG arrived in its
decision, though we accept some of its premises (i.e., that the national disapplication
of EU acts may be justified in some rare and exceptional cases). However, even
though we are not all constitutional pluralists, we take issue with some aspects of
the reasoning behind the original statement and question the doctrinal and empirical
arguments it invokes in favour of EU law’s unconditional supremacy.
The signatories’ critique of constitutional pluralism (CP) and the very possibility
of national constitutional review of EU acts is, first of all, based on the fear that
CP might facilitate the misuse (or abuse) of the ideas of national constitutional
identity or essential Member State competences. Certainly, it is correct to point
out that the concepts of constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity can be
marshalled in ways that most scholars (including pluralist themselves) would find
unacceptable. Indeed, it is worth noting that the BVerfG’s Weiss decision prompted
very different reactions, some of them quite critical, from prominent scholars of CP
(see the dissonant views of Maduro and Avbelj). Nevertheless, we suggest that the
observation of a risk of abuse holds true for a number of other concepts, including
those who form core principles of EU law themselves. The very ideas of democracy,
rule of law or fundamental rights are equally prone to abuse, mischaracterization, or
selective application. The CJEU itself has been accused of abusing the concept of
citizenship to justify competence creep beyond what had been agreed upon by the
Member States. And yet it would not be convincing to discard these concepts solely
on that basis.
As regards CP as such, we remain divided over its theoretical merits. We agree,
however, that the main problem behind the statement is that it attacks an empirical
conclusion on normative grounds. The risks that the authors attribute to CP do
not actually result from the doctrine of constitutional pluralism itself. If anything,
those risks result from lingering ambiguities in the design of the composite
constitutional order that CP, as a descriptive theory, attempts to account for
(the fact of incompatible claims to final authority) and whose negative effects it
attempts to mitigate (e.g. by proposing principles to promote coexistence and mutual
accommodation between those claims). Whether CP provides us with the most
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plausible descriptive account of the EU legal order is a question we do not attempt
to address here (national monists would disagree). Nevertheless, we believe that
by challenging CP’s descriptive insights by appeal to the normative theory of EU
Monism the statement fails to engage with and do justice to the former. For these
reasons, we find their criticism incomplete and thus insufficient.
The authors correctly remind us of the ECJ’s position advanced in Costa  and
submit that, contrary to what some pluralist authors would suggest, the answer to
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz or the final say question is unequivocal: “the law as it
stands today is clear: no national court can overrule a CJEU judgment”. Yet their
conclusion that the ECJ’s position suffices to preclude any competing claim by
a national constitutional court rests on a premise which has been disputed from
the very outset of the European integration process: namely that of absolute and
unconditional supremacy of EU law. Put differently, it denies the empirical fact that
both the ECJ and the BVerfG (and other national courts) claim ultimate constitutional
authority by making the normative point that, according to EU law, the ECJ claims
ultimate constitutional authority. We do acknowledge the signatories’ argument
that “the Member States have agreed – voluntarily – to be bound by EU law and to
respect rulings of its Court of Justice so long as they remain members”. But again,
we cannot help to note that the conditions and extent of that voluntary agreement
has been understood differently at the national level, crucially with regard to the
questions of Kompetenz-Kompetenz or national constitutional identities. And the
fact that the ECJ’s sweeping claim has been repeatedly contested is, in our view, of
paramount significance – at least as far as the argument from voluntary agreement is
concerned. So is the fact that, as reminded by Bobi# and Dawson, previous attempts
to gain Member State unequivocal approval and democratic support for a more
robust understanding of primacy have clearly failed.
The signatories also advance two normative arguments in support of the
unconditional understanding of EU law’s supremacy: the argument from uniform
and effective application, and the argument from the equality of the Member States.
With regard to the first argument, the authors suggest that any major departure
from EU law’s uniformity would pose a substantial threat to the process of European
integration, for “allowing national courts to declare that CJEU judgments they deem
unacceptable are inapplicable in their countries would destroy the EU legal order”.
Certainly, the proponents of unconditional supremacy are right to point out that
the principle of uniform application will be limited by this kind of national decisions.
But whether allowing for such limitations would necessarily bring an end to the
process of European legal integration is an open question. It is an empirical matter,
rather than the only or most likely outcome one should expect. Historically, neither
the first Czech ultra vires decision in Landtová, nor the Danish one in Ajos/Dansk
Industri have led to such dramatic consequences. And whereas both the timing and
the subject matter of Weiss make it much more serious than the aforementioned
decisions, the point we want to convey is that less uniformity does not necessarily
entail complete disintegration. On the contrary, on many occasions it is EU law itself
that allows for certain accommodation or even derogations, be it by virtue of Article
4(2) TEU, the mandatory requirements, or the principle of proportionality. Surely, it
does matter legally (and normatively) whether these derogations or exceptions are
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mandated by EU law or not; and in our view it is certainly more desirable to have
them mandated by EU law then decided unilaterally. Yet, this does not undermine
our point that such exceptions to uniformity are unlikely to immediately unravel the
EU legal order – even if they happen to be justified solely on the grounds of Member
State constitutional law.
With regard to the second argument –  i.e. the equality of the Member States
– the signatories of the statement are right to point out that it is an important
normative consideration and a sound argument in favour of the CJEU having the
ultimate jurisdiction over the questions of interpretation and validity of EU law. Yet, a
constitutional pluralist or national monist could argue that, contrary to what the CJEU
stated in the Weiss press release, unconditional supremacy is not the only way of
guaranteeing such equality. For, if it is recognized that in exceptional situations
where certain core Member State constitutional commitments or powers are at issue,
national constitutional exceptions should be warranted, then at least one important
aspect of the notion of equality is preserved; namely that of reciprocity with respect
to said national constitutional essentials. Certainly, this comes at a cost; namely that
of uniform application of EU law and its values, both normative and instrumental. On
the other hand, one could suggest that the expected benefits of protecting national
constitutional essentials can occasionally outweigh the downsides of restricting the
principle of equality understood as uniformity. In fact, this is precisely the solution
that, despite the aforementioned concerns, most national constitutional courts have
insisted on, pointing to their competing understandings of the sources (and limits)
of EU law’s authority. Which, in our view, invites us to look for ways to think equality
of the Member States without elevating it to some kind of a master principle that
would categorically preclude the national disapplication of EU acts in some rare
and extraordinary cases. Especially if the very Member States and their peoples
– whose equal status within the Union is at issue — still have not agreed that
unconditional primacy and uniformity of application of EU law is the only way to
go. To summarize, we do not mean to downplay the very real risks posed by the
BVerfG’s ruling in Weiss to the authority of the CJEU. The decision underscores
the profound challenges the EU legal order faces in commanding authority over the
domestic legal orders, as well as the need to critically evaluate academic concepts
and theories concerning the relationship between EU and national law. And while
we share many of the concerns which the authors of the original blogpost raised, the
solution cannot be to affirm legal doctrines and theoretical premises as if they were
undisputed. We should come to terms with the fact that the contested relationship
between EU and national law is bound to generate tensions rather than wish them
away. For the “take it or leave it”-approach proposed denies realities on the ground
and is likely rather a cause for further disintegration than stability.
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